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ABSTRACT 
William Clyde Partin III: The Eye & the Arm: Prosthetics & Visual Culture in France, 1915–1925 
(Under the direction of Daniel Sherman) 
 
This thesis traces three moments in the changing conceptions of the prosthetic in the visual 
cultures of postwar France: first, the medical photographs of Jules Amar, wartime director of 
the French laboratory for military prostheses and professional education, second, the Purist 
paintings of Fernand Léger produced in the years following the conclusion of World War I, and 
third, the Dada objects of Man Ray created under the dual influence of Paris Dada and emergent 
Surrealism. Though these cultural producers worked in different media and from distinct 
ideological perspectives, each engages the “prosthetic” as a key element for his visualizations of 
a radically re-organized (or, in Man Ray’s case, dis-organized) postwar society. These images 
demonstrate the conceptual abstraction of the prosthetic between 1915, when “prosthetic” 
referred almost exclusively to a material artifact, and 1925, by which point “prosthetic” 
encompassed to both the material artifact, as well as a discursive framework.  
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Introduction 
Among concepts that have entered academic discourse in the last century, few terms 
have proven quite so flexible as “prosthetic.” Typically used as a means of conceptualizing the 
relationships between the body and its artificial extensions, the term has attached itself, albeit 
with significant variation in meaning, to disciplines as varied as psychoanalysis, industrial 
design, medicine, marketing, and media theory.1 Yet the prosthetic’s present ubiquity in cultural 
analysis runs the risk of masking its histories. Like the divide between the body and its 
extensions, theories of the prosthesis are replete with distinctions and deconstructions, 
mediated by the middle ground of the “artificial substitute.”2 Though “prosthetic” entered the 
English language in the sixteenth century as “the addition of a letter or syllable to a word,” by 
the turn of the twentieth century, it referred almost exclusively to the art of making artificial 
limbs, as well as the limbs themselves.3 This thesis examines how the prosthetic was re-
conceptualized in the first decades of the twentieth century, as it passed from a rather narrow 
description of a specific class of medical objects to a potent metaphor of cultural analysis, and, 
specifically, how the visual cultures of postwar France participated in this history. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The literature on the prosthetic is vast and a complete review of all its implications is far beyond what is 
possible in the space of this essay. Generally speaking, however, I refer here to Freud’s famous claim that 
man is a “prosthetic god” in his 1931 “Civilization and its Discontents,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol. 21 (London: 
Hogarth, 1961), 39, Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1964), and Henry Ford’s 1922 autobiography My Life and Work (New York: Doubleday 
Page & Company, 1922). Sarah Jain provides an excellent overview of the vastly different uses and abuses 
of “prosthetic” in her journal essay, “The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis 
Trope,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 24 1 (Winter 1999): 31–54). 
 
2 Sarah Coffey, “Prosthesis,” Chicago School of Media Theory, 
https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/prosthesis/, accessed March 2, 2015. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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 Consider, for example, a graph [Figure 1] of the relative frequency of “prosthetic” in 
publications since 1800.4 Though used infrequently during the first twenty years of the 	  
twentieth century, the term saw an explosion of popularity in the 1920s, climbing steadily 
throughout subsequent decades before peaking in the 1980s. Though this graph is necessarily 
inexact and slanted towards English-language texts, it nonetheless marks the moment at which 
the prosthetic began to take on a life of its own. At first, it is tempting to link the prosthetic’s rise 
in popularity to the material culture of World War I, when artificial limbs were distributed to 
wounded veterans in unprecedented numbers. Yet its spike in usage takes place not during 
wartime, but almost a decade later. The visibility of prosthetic limbs alone is not enough to 
explain the term’s rise in importance. 
 Still, I propose that there is an essential link between these two events. As Sarah Jain has 
argued, prostheses are “discursive frameworks, as well as material artifacts.”5 Though not 
equivalent, these two categories are nonetheless mutually illuminating: the former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This graph was produced using Google’s Ngram service, which tracks the relative frequency with which a 
keyword appears in a given year’s publications, using the keyword “prosthetic” in the English corpus 
between 1800 and 2000 with a level smoothing of 2. The service should not be considered definitive: 
however, it is useful for providing a general sense of the relative popularity of a given term over time, as 
has been my purpose in including it here. 
 
5 Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination,” 33. 
 
Figure 1 
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encompasses, but is not limited to, the latter, while the latter is arguably the clearest 
manifestation of the former. In the context of postwar Europe, the sudden and widespread 
appearance of prosthetics (the material artifact) provoked reflection on the former (the 
discursive framework), which quickly became a category of analysis in its own right. 
 This thesis traces three moments in this process in the visual cultures of postwar France: 
first, the medical photographs of Jules Amar, wartime director of the French laboratory for 
military prostheses and professional education, second, the Purist paintings of Fernand Léger 
produced in the years following the conclusion of World War I, and third, the Dada objects of 
Man Ray created under the dual influence of Paris Dada and emergent Surrealism. I do not take 
these three sets of cultural productions to be the sole examples of this process. Rather, these 
three sets of images demonstrate the changing conceptualization of the prosthetic between 1915, 
when it was almost exclusively understood as a material artifact, and 1925, by which point it 
included both the discursive framework and the material artifact. Accordingly, I have arranged 
my visual evidence both chronologically and in order of increasing “abstraction”: Amar’s 
prostheses are artificial limbs, while the Dada objects of Man Ray must be understood as 
prostheses in a more conceptual sense.  
 A feature common to each of the three case studies, both in the images themselves and 
my interpretation of them, is an awareness of an apparent loss of “function,” whether for 
wounded veterans (Amar), industrial laborers (Léger), or the artwork itself (Man Ray). In every 
case, the “loss” was brought on or made apparent by  the social, economic, and cultural 
upheavals of World War I. Though this trio of cultural producers worked in a variety of media 
and from very different ideological perspectives, each engages the “prosthetic” as a key element 
for his visualizations of a radically re-organized (or, in Man Ray’s case, dis-organized) postwar 
society. In examining the prosthetic as its implications expanded beyond a specific class of 
medical devices, Bill Brown’s “thing theory” offers a fruitful model: while “objects” possess a 
	   5	  
readily definable function, “things” do not.6 In Brown’s revisionist interpretation of Heidegger, 
“objects” become “things” when they can no longer fulfill their socially-conditioned function and 
thus provoke the subject into confronting the “thingness” of the apparently “useless” object. This 
encounter leads the subject to either restore the “thing’s” “objecthood,” discard the “thing,” or 
repair it such that the original function is restored. 
Given that the “purposes” of an object are socially-defined, it is possible to say that there 
are both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” purposes for an object, leading to debates the “proper” 
function of a given object. This is true not only of inanimate objects, but also of human beings, at 
least in the sense that Brown describes. A quick survey of primary sources dealing with the 
wounded veteran reveals that wounded veterans were often thought of as “useless,” if only for 
purposes of alarmism. Writing in The New York Times, Virginia Graham Fair, an American 
Francophile and wife of the industrialist William Vanderbilt II, echoed a common sentiment in a 
1916 report on the American Ambulance (Hospital) in Neuilly-sur-Seine: 
  As these men come to the Ambulance, and as they would remain for the rest of their 
lives if their wounds were simply left to heal, they are objects of indescribable 
repulsiveness both to themselves and to everyone who sees them . . . but how wonderful 
it is to feel that through our help, these beings who come to use as useless wreckage, 
helpless, objects merely of pity and aversion, are given back to France as men again.7 
 
Much of the recent art historical literature on World War I in France is devoted to the so-
called “return to order” that took place during and after the conflict, when conservative 
politicians triumphed domestically, advocating for the return of “traditional” values as a 
counterpoint to the excesses and disruptions of war.8 Culturally, the “return to order” was visible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28 1 (Autumn, 2001): 1–22. Martin Heidegger,  “The 
Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York, 1971), 174–82.  
 
7 Virginia Graham Fair, “Miracles of Surgery on Men Mutilated in War: Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt Tells 
of the Marvels that are being Accomplished by the Devoted Workers of the American Ambulance in 
France,” The New York Times, February 16, 1916. 
 
8 See, most famously, Kenneth Silver, Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-Garde and the First 
World War, 1914–1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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in the widespread abandonment of critical artistic practices by avant-garde artists in favor of 
conservative values of order, discipline, and restraint. Socially, as many authors have argued, 
the disruption of traditional gender relations during the war led to attempts to reestablish the 
“proper” places for men and women.9  Common to both this artistic and social conservatism is 
an overarching emphasis on the proper “place” and “function” of objects, both animate and 
inanimate, within the real or imagined society of France.  
Speaking to a gathering of French medical professionals and government officials at the 
Conférence faite pour les Oeuvres de Mutilés at the Palais de la Mutualité in January 1916, Jules 
Amar, then the director of the laboratoire de prothèse militaire et du travail professionnel, 
described at length the importance of prosthetic limbs and their place in the fantasies of 
personal and national rehabilitation.  
 . . . The hour has arrived, I believe, to organize the work of the wounded, such that each 
man can take his true place in the social machine, and contribute to it to the best of his 
ability, and, in this way, march towards prosperity.10 
 
France was, in these years, a kind of “social machine,” one that would supposedly work 
best when all its parts were in their “proper” place. Yet if any object has a defined “place” rooted 
in function alone, then the object is susceptible to both displacement and replacement. Enter the 
prosthesis: that which replaces what has been lost, be it limbs, laborers, or even works of art. As 
such, the prosthesis—as an object, a concept, and an image—provides a critical means of 
examining the interpenetrating discourses of rehabilitation, industrial management, and artistic 
practice in wartime and postwar France. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Daniel Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999): 8, 67, and Mary Louise Robert, Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in 
Postwar France, 1917–1927 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
 
10 Jules Amar, “La prothèse et le travail des mutilés” (Paris: H. Dunod and E. Pinat, 1916), 4. The 
conference took place on January 12, 1916 and the proceedings were published later that year under the 
title of Amar’s keynote lecture. 
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I. Hommes Complets 
In the vast body of literature dedicated to the conflict, the First World War has 
entrenched itself as the Materialschlacht: the war of the machine. Historians have long noted 
the crucial role that technology played in exponentially increasing the lethality of war. Between 
technological “advancements” like smokeless gunpowder, flamethrowers, and chemical 
weapons, the role, to say nothing of the agency, of the individual soldier was increasingly 
subordinated to his technological extensions. The struggle to comprehend the matériel of 
modern warfare is a recurrent motif in the memoirs, diaries, and letters who those who served at 
the front.11 Yet not every soldier saw technology as demonic: while some inevitably remained 
horrified by the machine ascendant, others found new potentials in, and even affection for, the 
devices of industrial warfare.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York: Penguin, 1997), xiii, 52. 
 
12 Eric Leed, No Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 31. Mary Habeck also provides a useful review of the ways in which soldiers attempted to 
comprehend the experience of industrial warfare through language in her article “Technology and the 
First World War,” in Winter, Park, and Habeck eds., The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
 
Figure 2 
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To be sure, a heightened awareness of human beings’ increasing dependence upon 
technology was not limited to the militaries of combatant nations. Signs of the increasingly 
porous distinction between man and machine were numerous in the early years of the twentieth 
century, but perhaps nowhere were such ambiguities felt more acutely than they were with 
respect to artificial limbs, which were produced and distributed in record numbers during and 
after World War I. And yet, like soldiers’ own understandings of their technological extensions, 
the prosthetic, and, more broadly, the image of the man-machine hybrid, was open to 
interpretation by cultural producers on both sides of the conflict. The image of the machine-man 
was, for some, a fearful reminder of the destruction brought about by World War I. In Berlin 
Dadaist Otto Dix’s caustic drypoint print Kriegskrüppel (1920) [Figure 2], for example, the 
artist depicts a quartet of maimed soldiers, whose bodies have become as mechanized as the war 
that claimed their flesh. For others, most famously the Futurists, the man-machine hybrid was a 
potent image upon which cultural producers could rehearse their utopian fantasies of 
rehabilitation and industrialization.13 
This heterogeneity of viewpoints indicates that prosthetic limbs were privileged sites for 
the negotiation of intersecting discourses of masculinity, rehabilitation and industrialization in 
the context of the First World War. This section examines a selection of photographs taken in 
order to illustrate two publications on the topic of prosthetics written by the French labor expert 
Jules Amar (1879-1935): “La prothèse et le travail des mutilés” (1916) and Organisation 
physiologique du travail (1918).14 As the wartime director of the Laboratoire de prothèse 
militaire et du travail professionnel, it was Amar’s responsibility to oversee the development and 
implementation of a systematic program of rehabilitation and re-education for wounded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Hal Foster advances this argument in the titular chapter of his 1999 book, Prosthetic Gods. Foster offers 
a psychoanalytic account of the wartime work of Futurists Wyndham Lewis and Filippo Marinetti, arguing 
that, for both artists, hybridization offered a means of constructing a new, masculine subjectivity capable 
of navigating the cultural textures of industrial society. Hal Foster, “Prosthetic Gods,” in Prosthetic Gods 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 109-150. 
 
14 Amar, “La prothèse.” Amar, Organisation.  
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veterans that would ensure their successful reentry into civilian life. The crux of Amar’s 
approach to rehabilitation lay in potential benefits of prosthetic re-memberment. Through the 
use of artificial limbs, Amar sincerely believed that veterans could regain their dignity as 
hommes complets. “La prothèse” and Organisation describe Amar’s comprehensive approach to 
prosthetic-aided rehabilitation, in addition to providing insight into the author’s beliefs about 
the social importance of work for the French man. 
 My argument centers on what Hal Foster has called the “double logic of the prosthesis,” a 
concept that points towards prosthetics’ paradoxical status as an addition to the body that 
simultaneously registers a subtraction from it.15 Though Amar’s writings have been the subject 
of analysis by a number of scholars, most notably Roxanne Panchasi, many readings of 
Organisation and “La prothèse” treat the photography contained therein as merely illustrative 
of the process Amar describes in his texts.16 Yet such a reading is incomplete, for it overlooks the 
prescriptive role these photographs play in the context of Amar’s plan for rehabilitation. Above 
all, the photography of Organisation and “La prothèse” is intended to establish the “normalcy,” 
both biologically and socially, of life after prosthetic re-memberment. The “success” of Amar’s 
photographs, I argue, depends upon the degree to which they are capable of neutralizing this 
paradox. That is, the photographs of Organisation and “La prothèse” do not cast the prosthetic 
limb as either an enhancement or a detriment to the body. Rather, these images attempt to 
“normalize” their existence as part of the body—no more, and no less. Moreover, through Amar’s 
implicit opinions on “normality” as both a biological condition and a social status, these 
photographs offer a means of examining the discourses of socio-political rehabilitation after the 
war, especially that of the reestablishment of traditional gender roles and the reconstruction of 
the ruined French economy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Foster, Prosthetic Gods, 111. 
 
16 Roxanne Panchasi, “Reconstructions: Prosthetics and the Rehabilitation of the Male Body in World War 
I France,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 7 (Fall 1995) 109-140. 
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As Roxanne Panchasi has argued, “the scarred and mutilated body of the disabled soldier 
[was] a privileged site in the fantasy of national recuperation in France.”17 The reconstruction of 
the wounded soldier functioned as one way of imagining the reconstruction of a nation ravaged 
by war. To be sure, prosthetic limbs were but one aspect of this discourse of rehabilitation, but 
they were nevertheless a highly visible and privileged sign. By one count, over 41,000 men in 
France had their limbs amputated during the war, the majority of whom (69%) lost one leg, 
while a smaller percentage, 28%, lost one arm. The remaining three percent lost two or more 
limbs.18 The act of treating wounded veterans was more than a medical procedure: it was also 
understood to restore a soldier’s “manhood,” a concept embroiled in ideas about productivity 
and the normativity of the organically “whole” masculine body. Though prosthetics had been 
produced in limited numbers in Europe since antiquity, World War I proved to be a laboratory 
in which researchers could experiment with new materials and designs to meet the needs 
veterans who had lost their limbs at the front.19 
 In France, this task belonged to Jules Amar, a French labor expert and professor who, in 
September 1914, was appointed director of the laboratoire de prothèse militaire et du travail 
professionnel, a position he would hold until the cessation of hostilities in November 1918.20 
Prior to the war, Amar, along with an established group of French and German scientists, had 
been engaged in the scientific study of the body as governed by the principles of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 113. 
 
18 Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War (London: Reaktion 
Books, 1996), 33. In addition to these, Bourke estimates that another 272,000 men suffered injuries of the 
arms or legs that did not require amputation. 60,500 were wounded in the head or eyes, and 89,000 
sustained other serious damage to their bodies. 
 
19 Mary Guyatt, “Better Legs: Artificial Limbs for British Veterans of the First World War,” Journal of 
Design History 4 (Technology and the Body, 2001): 307-325. Guyatt examines the various advancements 
in material and design of prosthetic limbs, especially the transition from primarily wood-based, static 
prosthetics to metallic artificial limbs with joints capable of simulating, however poorly, the function of 
elbows and knees. 
 
20 Hugues and Janine Monod, “Jules Amar (1879-1935): A propos d’un centenaire,” lecture presented to 
the French Society of the History of Medicine, March 24, 1979. Unless otherwise noted, all translations 
are my own. 
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thermodynamics. For Amar and his contemporaries, the body was a vital system of energy 
capable of being measured and, more important, optimized to improve its productive capacities. 
For Amar, this work was not simply economic. As Anson Rabinbach notes, the science of labor 
and the study of the body in Europe in the final years of the nineteenth century was tied 
inexorably to the “social ethic of energy conservation.”21 
 Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, European scientists of labor were introduced 
to Taylorism, a system for the rationalization of production laid out by the American Frederick 
Taylor in a series of publications leading up to his 1911 book, The Principles of Scientific 
Management.22 As a nominally science-based approach to the maximization of productivity, 
Taylorism advocated the division of production into small, simple tasks and the standardization 
of industrial manufacturing. Though some (not unfairly) opposed Taylorism as a system that 
ultimately benefited management and not the laborers themselves, Taylorism was received 
enthusiastically in France by university-trained scientists such as Amar, who both contributed to 
and reflected a growing interest in the rational management of the body.23 While Taylorism was 
far from ubiquitous in France by August 1914, its ideas were nonetheless in heavy circulation 
there largely due to the efforts of men like Amar.  
Amar’s interest in Taylorism carried over to his work in his Laboratoire, which was 
founded in 1914 and funded by the French Academy of Sciences.24 Amar had been involved with 
the French Ministry of War since 1908, when he was contracted to perform scientific studies on 
the effects of fatigue. The subsequent appointment to the laboratoire was a natural next step, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990), 8. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Marjorie Beale, The Modernist Enterprise: French Elites and the Threat of Modernity, 1900-1940 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000): 73. Beale examines the relationship between Taylorism and 
economic elites. As she argues, “the impetus to modernize in France frequently grew out of its opposite: 
the wish to preserve what the French idealized as ‘traditional’ relations between the social classes.” 
 
24 See, H. & J. Monod, “Jules Amar,” 3. 
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both for the Ministry of War and for Amar himself. Indeed, the war, as Rabinbach has argued 
argues, proved an excellent laboratory for the science of work and the application of 
“ergonomics at the front.”25 Under the guise of national defense, Amar could continue his 
advocacy for Taylorism by associating it with interests of national security and the rehabilitation 
of veterans. Moreover, Taylorism could be associated with French nationalism due to its clear 
delineation between the working and managerial classes.26 
 The first significant publication of the laboratoire came in January 1916, when Amar 
presented the lecture “La prothèse et le travail des mutilés” at the Conférence faite pour les 
Oeuvres des Mutilés at the Palais de la Mutualité in Paris.27 In his opening remarks, Amar 
declares that “the hour has arrived, I believe, to organize the work of the wounded, such that 
each man can take his true place in the social machine, and contribute to it to the best of his 
ability, and, in this way, march towards prosperity.”28 Work, unsurprisingly, lay at the center of 
Amar’s account of the situation in which wounded veterans found themselves: “making rational 
use of human capacities, even when they are reduced . . . [is of critical importance to] the 
material and moral future of many thousands of French families.”29 Amar buttresses his account 
with the claim that 80 percent of the wounded could return to work in some capacity, along with 
patriotic, though unsubstantiated, anecdotes of the eagerness with which amputated veterans 
approached their new bodily and social circumstances. Conflating physiological and 
psychological dignity, Amar insists in “La prothèse” that the restoration of wounded veterans as 
“hommes complets” was as simple as “restoring” what limbs had been lost and putting the 
mutilé back to work. Amar would revisit this conclusion in greater detail in Organisation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Rabinbach, The Human Motor, 265. 
 
26 Discussed in, Beale, The Modernist Enterprise, 73. 
 
27 Jules Amar, La prothèse et le travail des mutilés. 
  
28 Amar, “La prothèse et le travail des mutilés,” 4. 
 
29 Ibid. 
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physiologique du travail (1917), a “complete” examination of the process and benefits of 
prosthetic re-memberment. 
And yet, even as prosthetic limbs functioned as a privileged sign for the discourse of 
rehabilitation, they were also a reminder of the horrors of the all-too-recent past. Paradoxically, 
the prosthetic limb attested to technology’s capacity both to heal and to destroy bodies. The 
unprecedented visibility of prosthetic limbs, after all, was a response to the new kinds of 
violence visited upon soldiers’ bodies by new machines of warfare.  In Dismembering the Male, 
Bourke notes that the unprecedented severity of injuries during the war was largely the result of 
“effective instruments of dismemberment, such as artillery fire, hand grenades, and small 
arms.”30 Yet hand grenades, small arms, and sighted weapons are, ironically, every bit as much 
“prostheses” as mechanical limbs are. As Ryan Bishop and John Phillips have argued, from 
“World War I to the present, the story of military technology has been one of prosthetic 
extension.” 31 This irony points to the long double life the prosthetic has enjoyed as both a 
concept and a specific class of objects, including medical devices like artificial limbs (the 
colloquial use of the term), but also objects like weapon sights and small arms.  
These two aspects of the prosthetic—the object and the concept—are not equivalent. 
They emerged and developed separately. Even so, the prosthetic-as-object and prosthetic-as-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bourke, Dismembering the Male, 34. Bourke also notes that firearm technology was only partially 
responsible for the horrifying quantity and severity of injuries. The dank, swampy conditions in the 
trenches of Flanders made treatment of wounded men substantially more challenging than in previous 
wars. 
 
31 Ryan Bishop and John Phillips, “Sighted Weapons and Modernist Opacity: Aesthetics, Poetics, 
Prosthetics,” Boundary 29 2 (Summer 2002): 159. The notion that weapons are a “subtraction” from the 
body is not readily apparent. However, there are a number of ways of conceptualizing how weapons do, in 
fact, register this subtraction. In directing soldiers’ attention towards the technological representations of 
the world (as in, for example, the heads up display of an Apache helicopter), soldiers’ attention is directed 
further away from the material world and the bodily experience of that world. In short, the more we 
watch, the less we see. In a similar vein, prosthetic enhancement of the body necessarily points towards a 
shortcoming in the fully organic body. In this way, the alternative and additional subjectivities made 
possible by prosthetics point towards something that is incapable of being experienced by a human 
unaltered by prosthetic technology. Finally, and most simply, as offensive technologies meant to increase 
humans’ capacities to maim and kill one another, these kinds of prosthetics threaten the “subtraction” of 
the body (albeit other bodies) in very literal ways. 
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concept can be brought together in mutually illuminating ways, for, in many ways, prosthetic 
limbs make visible many aspects of the prosthetic-as-concept. Though the term is derived from 
the Greek “pro” (“to add”) and “tithenai” (“to place”), the prosthetic differs fundamentally from 
other kinds of synthesis in that it is always preceded by loss. In the case of artificial limbs, this 
loss is the trauma of dismemberment, the violation of the body as a “complete” form. The 
prosthetic limb, in theory if not always in practice, is meant to counter this consequences of 
dismemberment by replicating the value of the lost limb, and in doing so, return the body to its 
normative “whole” state.32 
Yet loss is not so easily forgotten, and the very moment at which the prosthetic appears 
to offer a solution to the “body in pieces” is precisely the moment when the organic body begins 
to appear irrelevant. As Bill Brown has argued, “the very success of mechanized industry and the 
growth of scientific management had disintegrated the body at the site of production.”33 Human 
labor was reduced, materially and analytically, to the operation of individual body parts; 
workers were balkanized into the parts of their sum. With respect to re-memberment, the 
prosthetic thus poses the question, “what good is a body if its functions are replicable (or even 
enhanceable) by machines?”  
To twenty-first century scholars, the notion that the body and its technological 
extensions are not so discrete might seem obvious. Yet that dichotomy was far more rigid in the 
early years of the twentieth century, when the body was understood to be a naturally given 
whole, whereas the machine was an autonomous agent. The prosthetically re-membered man-
machine hybrids that began to appear in industry and all forms of cultural production as a result 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Charles R. Garoian, “Verge of Collapse: The Pros/thesis of Art Research,” International Review of 
Qualitative Research Vol. 3, No 1. (Spring 2010): 89-102. Garoian’s article provides an overview of the 
utopian myth of wholeness and normality in the human body. Though Garoian is ultimately interested in 
using the metaphor of the prosthetic (and the interconnectivity it implies) to disrupt and extend beyond 
the dialectical closure of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the article is useful for historicizing the 
discursive character of wholeness as bodily normality under cultural modernity. 
 
33 Bill Brown, “Science Fiction, the World’s Fair, and the Prosthetics of Empire, 1910-1915,” Cultures of 
United States Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham: Duke UP, 1993), 136. 
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of the war provoked a profound challenge to the prevailing discourse that treated the body and 
the machine as separate entities. 
The photography of Organisation physiologique du travail and Prothèse et le Travail 
des Mutilés should thus be understood in the context of this paradox, even as it attempts to 
neutralize that paradox. For in order for Amar’s prosthetic program to be “successful,” re-
membered veterans needed to be persuaded that their new “limb” was neither an addition—
which is to admit that it was prefigured by the trauma of “loss”—nor the consequence of a 
subtraction, which is to admit the apparent irrelevance of the organic body. Instead, the 
photography contained in Amar’s texts attempt to sidestep the double logic of the prosthesis 
entirely and claim that the prosthetically re-membered body is itself a “homme complet.”  
The fantasy of a prosthetically “enhanced” body as a “whole body” is not so different 
from one historical function of prostheses: a means of restoring “normalcy” to the damaged 
body. Like all disabilities, amputation must be understood as both a medical condition and a 
social status, and if disability is itself socially conditioned, then “normalcy” (understood, 
conventionally, as the absence of “disability”) is equally contingent upon its social circumstance. 
In characterizing bodily and social normality in Europe around the end of World War I, it is 
useful to refer to Sigmund Frued’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which was written during and 
(at least in part) in response to that war.34 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes 
how “the terrible war that has just ended has given rise to a great number of ‘traumatic neuroses 
. . . brought about by mechanical force,’” the symptoms of which include “general enfeeblement,” 
“hysteria,” and “the general disturbance of mental faculties.”35 Though Freud does not explicitly 
gender his account of bodily normalcy in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, we should note that his 
language implicitly refers to male bodies, through his allusions both to victims of the “terrible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920),” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol. 18 (London: Hogarth, 1957), 
7-23. 
 
35 Ibid., 13. 
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war” (i.e. soldiers) and to their psychological symptoms (“enfeeblement” and “hysteria,” both of 
which would have been understood as “feminine”).36 In describing the psychological basis of 
these neuroses, Freud builds on his conception of the “bodily ego” previously laid out in the pre-
war essay, “On Narcissism.”37 The ego, Freud posits, emerges out of an image of its own body (or 
at least from a libidinal investment in that image). This “narcissistic” phase precedes any 
attachment to things in the world, as the body is the first love of the nascent subject. Critically, 
however, if the bodily image is violated (as in a body violated by trauma), the subject cannot 
cohere as a whole image and, as a result, its relations to external objects will be disrupted. Full 
subjectivity, from this perspective, depends upon the normative “wholeness” of the body. 
It’s not hard to imagine how such a conception of the bodily ego would appeal to 
someone like Amar, who was invested in restoring not only the physiological “normalcy” of the 
wounded veteran’s body, but also his psychological “normalcy:” being a homme complet was 
more than having a “whole” body. Though Freud is ultimately concerned with the psychological 
consequences of dismemberment, Amar effectively performs an associative inversion of this 
logic: if a compromised body means compromised subjectivity, then only an uncompromised 
body can have uncompromised subjectivity. Thus, for Amar, the reestablishment of 
psychological “normalcy” was as simple as re-establishing physiological “normalcy,” a task to 
which prosthetic limbs were perfectly suited. Prosthetics, under this logic, could be understood 
as liberating—or, more accurately, liberating insofar as they restored what “freedom” had been 
lost. Indeed, the “liberating” potential of prosthetic rememberment was fully realized at the 
exact moment of its complete “disappearance,” if not always visually than at least functionally. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Kaja Silverman examines extends Freud’s gendered logic in her book Male Subjectivity at the Margins 
(New York: Routledge, 1992). In her post-Lacanian view, the mutilated soldier was a key signifier for the 
challenge to male authority in and beyond wartime. Though her immediate primary source material is 
cinematic representations of male amputees in post-World War II America, the general form of her 
argument is highly applicable to postwar France. For Silverman, moments of historical trauma, like war, 
disrupt the relationship of the male subject to the phallus; the disabled soldier embodies this uncertainty. 
 
37 Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism (1914),” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol. 14 (London: Hogarth, 1957), 67-102. 
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Accordingly, the photographs of Organisation physiologique du travail and “Prothèse et 
le Travail des Mutilés” may be grouped into one of three categories of functionality: evaluation, 
labor, and leisure. Evaluation has been the subject of analysis by Roxanne Panchasi, who notes 
that the first phase of Amar’s rationalist approach to re-education of amputees involved a 
determination of the functional value of whatever remained of the lost limb, a process to which 
the “evaluative photographs” testify.38 One photograph [Figure 3], for example, demonstrates a 
method by which the power of a leg stump is quantified through the assistance of a treadmill 
that measures torque. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Roxanne Panchasi, “Reconstructions,” 109-140. 
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In Organisation, Amar groups artificial limbs into one of two not-entirely-distinct 
categories. In the first were mechanical limbs that ended in a “universal tool,” to which one 
could affix a variety of industrial tools [Figure 4 & 5]. In Amar’s view, prosthetic limbs of this 
type could be distributed to lower- and middle-class veterans who were likely to work in either 
factories or in agriculture.39 In contrast, upper-class veterans destined for careers in offices were 
offered a prosthetic arm that ended not in a “universal tool” but in a “mechanical hand” [Figure 
6 & 7] that would allow them to write and type.40 This class (in both senses of the word) of 
prosthetic had the added benefit of looking like an organic arm, itself a kind of “function” insofar 
as we understand some of the function of an arm to be its appearance as an arm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Panchasi briefly discusses class and prostheses in, Ibid., 124-128. 
 
40 Ibid. 
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In either case, the photographs of Organisation and “La prothèse” document men 
actively engaged in labor using their prosthetic arm. It is telling that the types of work 
depicted—hammering and typing—are not in themselves novel forms of labor, but ones that 
would be familiar to viewers. Though prosthetic re-memberment could in fact permit certain 
activities—the handling of extremely hot objects, for example—that would be impossible (or at 
least more challenging) for a purely organic body, the photographs in Organisation and “La 
prothèse” do not draw attention to such activities. Far from revolutionizing labor, prosthetics, 
for Amar, are meant to integrate themselves, as invisibly as possible, into already extant forms 
of labor. His concern is not the development of new forms of labor, but the preservation and 
restitution of old ones. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Figure 7 
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Moreover, while these images do attest to “normal” labor, they are also meant to portray 
the normalcy of labor. Insofar as labor was understood to be a normative condition for men in 
postwar France, one purpose of prosthetic re-memberment was to return to men their ability to 
labor as men. This basic sentiment is repeated throughout the modest body of literature on 
prosthetics and professional re-education during and after the first World War. Les blessés de 
Guerre: Prothèse et rééducation professionnelle, published in 1919 by l’Office national et les 
comités départmentaux le fonctionnement des oeuvres, is typical of these publications. In its 
preface, Paul Razous defends his program of professional re-education in economic terms:  
  My only desire is that this modest volume will help give our maimed veterans a 
satisfactory financial situation, which will provide moral support to the thousands of 
heroes who gave their flesh and blood for France.41 
 
 Amar, for his part, was more concerned with the importance of labor for the 
psychological well-being of men. Indeed, most of Organisation is dedicated to an extensive 
explanation of why professional re-education is utterly essential for the dignity of the individual 
soldier, as well as the “health” of the nation. In his chapters “L’Art de travailler” and “La 
Nécessité d’employer les blessés,” Amar frames his argument for  
professional reeducation as a re-establishment of the “normalcy” of masculine experience.42  
As was the case in wartime, the male body is called upon to serve the interests of the 
country. Given the association of artificial limbs with both the “masculine” spaces of military 
and industrial labor, prosthetics were a key point of contact between the intersecting discourses 
of masculinity and rehabilitation in postwar France. From 1914 to 1918 and thereafter, gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Paul Razous, Les Blessés de Guerre: Prothèse et Rééducation Professionnelle (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 
1919). There is no shortage of literature on reëducation and prostheses published in France during and 
after the war. To Amar and Razous’ volume, one could add J. Gourdon’s La Reprise du Travail par les 
Amputés et Estropiés de Guerre (Paris: Bordeaux, 1918) or André Tournade’s La Rééducation 
Professionnelle des Utilés de la Guerre: Rôle du Service de Santé (L. Fournier: Paris, 1917), both of which 
espouse the same basic argument of the importance, both personal and political, of labor. Amar’s volume 
is, to my knowledge, unique among these for its inclusion of images, photographic or otherwise. 
 
42 Jules Amar, “L’Art de travailler,” in Organisation physiologique du travail (Paris: H. Dunot and E. 
Pinat, 1917), 127-169. 
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was primary signifier for the social disruptions of war.43 Likewise, in postwar France, gender 
was no less important in re-establishing traditional social hierarchies. As Mary Louise Roberts 
writes, the “debate concerning gender identity became a primary way to embrace, resist, or 
reconcile oneself to changes associated with the war.”44 One aspect of this disruption had been 
the entrance of French women into the masculine space of the labor market in unprecedented 
numbers. Thus, putting men back to work also served to stabilize traditional roles that had been 
disturbed by the demands of wartime production. 
 Following the war, a central feature of the re-establishment of traditional gender roles 
was putting men back into jobs that had recently been performed by women (and, by extension, 
directing women towards more “appropriate” domestic labor)—that is, men needed to regain, or 
be put back in, their “proper” place. Prosthetically re-membered men, who had seen their 
masculinity doubly compromised—the loss of at least one limb (thus invoking the castration 
complex), as well as the apparent loss of the ability to labor as men—were therefore a potent 
symbol of this widespread re-entrenchment of traditional gender roles in France following the 
conclusion of the war. 
Representations of leisure also play a leading role in Organisation and “La prothèse.” As 
Peter Burke has famously argued, the invention of labor-leisure dichotomy and was a critical 
feature of the culture of industrialized economies.45 In both Organisation and “La prothèse,” 
Amar is careful to include a number of photographs of prosthetically re-membered men engaged 
in various types of leisurely activities, from the physically strenuous to the artistically 
stimulating. Through the aid of an artificial limb, wounded veterans could once more play the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 There is a significant body of literature on the topic of gender and wartime France. See, for example, 
Daniel Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999): 8, 67. 
 
44 Mary Louise Robert, Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
 
45 Peter Burke, “The Invention of Leisure in Early Modern Europe,” Past and Present No. 146 (February 
1995): 135-150. 
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violin or ride a horse [Figures 8 & 9], both of which are held up as emblematic of leisure 
following prosthetic re-memberment. As was the case with labor, the “leisure” photographs of 
Organisation and “La prothèse” document activities that would be familiar to viewers, 
prosthetically re-membered or not. Once again, the images serve to re-establish “normalcy.” For 
Amar, the prosthetic is not intended to allow new kinds of experience. Rather, it is meant to 
restore “normative” experiences, whether of leisure or labor, that had been lost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Popular imagery of prosthetics in mass market publications largely reproduced the 
normalizing character of the photographs contained in Organisation and “La prothèse.” As 
Katherine Feo has argued, there was no avoiding the common sight of the artificial limb during 
and after World War I, especially in France. Despite being a tangible reminder of the trauma of 
war, though, artificial limbs could be held up as signs of pride and images of sacrifice.46 In La 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Katherine Feo, “Invisibility: Memory, Masks, and the Great War,” Journal of Design History Vol. 20 
No. 1 (2007): 17-27. Feo argues that facial prosthetics, while undeniably related to artificial limbs, 
ultimately pointed towards a very different set of problems. As Feo argues, facial disfigurement was seen 
as the “worst loss of all,” for in addition to the violation of the bodily whole, it also constituted a perceived 
loss of the subject’s humanity. For Feo, this accounts, in part, for the comparative lack of visibility of facial 
prosthetics in England following the war. Though large numbers of men had had their faces disfigured 
during the war, they were a less common sight in urban centers. Indeed, many chose self-imposed exiles. 
 
Figure 8 Figure 9 
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Guerre mondiale, a daily that ran from September 1914 until December 1917, photographs of 
prosthetically re-membered veterans were published with some frequency. In the March 30, 
1916 edition, a six panel spread [Figure 10] dedicated to a newly patented artificial hand informs 
readers of the various activities one can undertake using the prosthetic hand—holding a hat, 
using a fork, and playing cards, for example.47 Once again, it is worth noting the continued 
emphasis on the quotidian. In the October 16, 1915 issue, for example, the daily ran a photo 
spread [Figure 11] dedicated to la maison Oscar-Hélène, an estate outside of Paris at which 
wounded veterans could be rehabilitated. In one photograph, a group of men play volleyball in 
open air, one of whom, Mr. 
Riemenschneider, is identified as 
having had his arms replaced with 
mechanical prostheses. And, finally, in 
the April 13, 1918 edition of Le Monde 
Illustré, a photograph [Figure 12] 
depicts a group of veterans actively 
engaged in their reeducation. As the 
caption reads, “a school for 
hairdressing where for our glorious 
war wounded are learning a new skill 
that will allow them to improve their 
lot.” 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Alfred Gradenwitz. “Les Chefs-D’oeuvre de la science: la main automatique,” in La Guerre Mondiale 
No. 489 (March 30, 1916): 1-2. 
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While it is highly unlikely that the photographs published in La Guerre mondiale and 
L’Illustration were consciously modeled on the conventions laid out by Amar in Organisation 
and “La prothèse,” their similarity indicates the overwhelming discursive force of rehabilitation 
in France during and after the war, which informed both popular and “scientific” 
representations of prosthetic limbs. In every case, such imagery served to highlight the potential 
for a “normal” life after prosthetic re-memberment. Yet this belief was ultimately a fantasy. As 
Feo notes, pretending that prosthetics “made pre-war life a possibility in the post-war period 
seems to imply blithe optimism about the permanent consequences of disfigurement.”48 Feo 
likewise refers to what she calls the design “lag” of medical technology in this period.49 While it 
is true that the prosthesis was a contradictory sign that could attest to both the positive and 
negative aspects of technological advancement, it would be wrong to characterize that paradox 
as symmetrical. Technology’s capacity to disfigure far outstripped its capacity to adequately 
respond to that disfigurement. 
What Amar was constructing, in other words, was a fictive vision of a prosthetic utopia in 
which the “experience” of the prosthetically re-membered veteran was not demonstrably 
different from that of man in possession of a “whole” organic body. Yet prosthetic limbs, no 
matter how functional, inevitably registered bodily difference. There could, therefore, never be 
bodily “normalcy” for the prosthetically re-membered, for life is ultimately more than leisure 
and labor, and a body is more than the sum of its parts. The Taylorist utopia (or, depending on 
one’s perspective, dystopia) Amar envisioned could, perhaps, reify a society in which prosthetic 
re-memberment did not register bodily difference, yet, in 1918, France was very far from 
becoming such a society. As Rabinbach has argued, while World War I might have hastened the 
adoption of some Taylorist principles, Taylorism was far from ubiquitous in France. And as long 
as the “normative” body was a whole, organic body, Amar’s photographic and textual tactics of 	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“reconceptualizing” normalcy were never quite capable of realizing their author’s ambitious 
intentions. 
In Organisation and “La prothèse,” photography is one means of masking the prosthetic 
difference, yet even before these texts, that difference (i.e. “abnormality”) is ultimately 
impossible to avoid. Take, for example, one of the first photographs in Organisation [Figure 13], 
a lineup of prosthetic limbs prior to being affixed to the amputee. Its caption—“models of 
artificial legs in wood (center) and in leather (left and right)”—is soberingly descriptive.50 The 
most striking formal feature of the 
image, though, is the series of 
menacing shadows cast against the 
wall by the artificial legs in the harsh 
light of the studio. As Amelia Jones 
notes of Dada photography, “the 
shadow marks a fascination with the 
fragility and transience of corporeality, 
then, a fascination with death.”51 And 
while far from being a work of Dadaist 
photography, the shadows of Figure 
93 nevertheless appear to articulate 
the very condition of the subject of the 
photograph. For what is a prosthetic if 
not a “shadow” of something loss, a 
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sign of the fragility and transience of corporeality itself?  
Like the prosthetic, the shadow is both an image and a concept. Here, though, it serves to 
disrupt the fictive overcoming of prosthetic difference that Amar’s “normalizing” photography 
attempts to construct. In this way, this image is, in Freudian terms, uncanny—what has been 
repressed by “rationality” in order to preserve the illusory boundaries of lived experience returns 
to disrupt that boundary. Freud’s examples of uncanny objects or events—“dismembered limbs, 
a severed head, a hand cut off the wrist . . . feet which dance by themselves”—blur the subject’s 
ability to establish clear distinctions between the real and the imagined, the animate and the 
inanimate.52 Both dismembered and prosthetic limbs could thus provoke “uncanny” feelings in 
subjects—the inanimate made animate is no less “uncanny” than the animate made inanimate.  
Prosthetics, though extant prior to World War I, became increasingly visible as a result 
of the unparalleled levels of violence visited upon soldiers. Yet despite its traumatic associations, 
cultural attitudes towards prosthetic limbs were far from monolithic. For some, it was an 
uncanny reminder of the horrors of industrialized combat and a symbol of the disruptions of 
war. Yet for others, including Jules Amar, the prosthetic was a means of responding to and 
overcoming those same disruptions. Prosthetic limbs could point towards a process through 
which wounded veterans could once again be made hommes complets, restoring productivity 
capacities and masculinities that had been castrated by the trauma of dismemberment. The 
photographs contained within Amar’s most important publications point towards the crucial 
role artificial limbs might play in fantasies of rehabilitation. In this way, the mutilated body of 
the wounded veteran became a prosthetic for the nation. Restoring “normal” masculine 
embodied experience to soldiers who had seen their limbs claimed by the insatiable violence of 
World War I was, in other words, a synecdoche for the restoration of “normalcy” to a nation 
ravaged by war. In short, the prosthetic put the man back into place. 	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II: Purism and Prostheses 
 
In a recent essay on Fernand Léger’s postwar painting, Christopher Green writes of the 
artist’s “multiplicative vision” for the postwar generation to which Léger belonged.53 Referencing 
Léger’s famous La Ville (1920) [Figure 14], in which a pair of grey, anonymous walkers are 
dwarfed by the dynamic brilliance of the city they inhabit, Green writes that the figures may 
simultaneously be read as “new masters of the city, who would use the machine to construct a 
postwar modernity” and representatives of a “postwar humanity subject to the machine, whose 
faith in the benefits of machine production is no longer impervious to doubt.”54 
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In some ways, Green’s reading of La Ville is typical of the expansive literature on Léger’s 
postwar painting, the object of considerable debate largely on account of the complexity of the 
artistic and cultural politics Léger’s paintings negotiate.55 Never completely at ease with either 
Cubism or Purism, oscillating between abstraction and the subject, simultaneously embroiled in 
yet distanced from the politics of the moment, Léger’s postwar painting has defied simple 
explanations and has been subject to 
wildly different interpretations, in 
contemporary criticism as well as in the 
expansive art historical literature on the 
subject. Léger’s friend Maurice Raynal 
said of La Ville, “[it] does not so much 
allude to nature’s dynamism, but [is] a 
veritable transposition of the world’s 
activity.”56 At the same time, the poet 
Yvan Goll described La Ville as a 
“monstrous entity striding towards us.”57 
The heterogeneity of critical and 
scholarly views suggests that Léger’s own 
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perspective cannot be reduced to a simple binary of acceptance or rejection of modernity. 
Rather, this chapter argues for a kind of qualified enthusiasm, a “multiplicative vision” of 
modernity as simultaneously exciting and alienating, producing spectacles of unprecedented 
brilliance even as the humans who inhabited them became increasingly dull in comparison. This 
view, however, was developed over a period of several years, as is evidenced by the occupational 
portraits Léger produced in the aftermath of the war, especially The Mechanic (1920) [Figure 
15]. Above all, this body of work articulates a vision of simultaneous individuality and 
collectivism. Prosthetics play an important role in advancing this seemingly contradictory 
position, which maybe examined through Léger’s postwar artistic trajectory , as the artist 
divested himself from the Cubists and subsequently took up with the Purists, as well as the 
theories of scientific management that were circulating in France during the early 1920s. The 
logic of the prosthesis functions in two ways in these portraits: first, through their Taylorist-
influenced representation of the body as an amalgamation of functional components, and, 
second, in their presentation of the laborer himself as a prosthesis of the machine. 
Léger’s relationship to the various postwar avant-gardes and the rappel à l’ordre more 
generally was often more professional than personal: though the artist’s commitment to 
synthetic forms of painting was enough to earn him membership among the cubists who showed 
at Galérie L’Effort Moderne, he nevertheless remained distanced from them in crucial ways.58 
Likewise, though Léger began exhibiting with the Purists in 1921, his embrace of that movement 
was somewhat half-hearted. To some degree, Léger’s qualified self-association with postwar 
artistic avant-gardes mirrors his relationships to his brothers in arms on the front: though Léger 
frequently spoke admiringly of his comrades, his willingness to use their imaged bodies for 
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artistic experimentation in his wartime drawings indicates the artist’s distance from them as 
well.59 
The fluidity of Léger’s professional network has led to significant debate over the nature 
of Léger’s postwar work, especially with 
respect to its relationship to the art that 
Léger produced while serving in the 
French army. Though Green has 
previously argued for a clear delineation 
of Léger’s pre-and postwar painting 
based on a binary opposition of 
“intelligence, abstraction, and death” in 
war against “sensibility, things, and life” 
in peace, there is good reason to believe 
that there was both continuity and 
discontinuity between these bodies of 
work.60 Daniel Sherman has rightly 
observed that Léger, even at the height 
of the conflict [Figure 15],  never quite 
abandoned Cubism and, indeed, that 
Léger’s entire career was characterized 
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by the oscillation between abstract pictorial forms and readily identifiable subjects.61 Crucially, 
both before, during, and after the war, Léger never saw his dual interest in abstraction and 
“realism” as necessarily opposed: on the contrary, abstract forms represented a means of 
engaging more fully with the “real.”62 Moreover, despite his experiences as a sapper on the front, 
Léger retained his enthusiasm for the machine as both a concept and object of aesthetic 
inspiration. 
At the same time, Léger saw himself as fundamentally changed by his experience as a 
soldier. If he survived the war, as he wrote to his friend Louis Poughon in April 1915, he would 
become “one of the great postwar generation,” having found a new sense of his place among the 
“whole of the French people” as a result of serving with workers and peasants on the front.63 
Still, by the time of Léger’s first postwar show at Galerie L’Effort Moderne in February 1919, 
Léger had largely devoted himself to peacetime subjects, simultaneously producing drawings 
and paintings of tugboats, acrobats, mechanics, domestic scenes, dog walkers, and industrial 
laborers.64 Though Léger’s abrupt transition to peacetime subjects has been attributed to the 
artist’s desire to distance himself from patriotic zealots, there was, in fact, surprisingly little 
triumphalist art in Paris after the war.65 As such, it is likely that Léger was demonstrating his 
faith in the postwar generation that emerged from the conflagration of World War I. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Daniel Sherman, “Fernand Léger: Dessins de guerre, 1914-1917,” in Les Désastres de la Guerre, 1800-
2014, ed. Laurence Bertrand Dorléac (Paris: Somogy editions d’art, 2014), 200. 
 
62 For more on Léger’s contrast of forms, see: Matthew Affron, “Line, Form, Color, Luster: Léger’s 
Contrasts of Forms,” Cubism: The Leonard Lauder Collection (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art 
2014), 88-96. 
 
63 Léger to Louis Poughon, Argonne, April 12, 1915, in Derouet 1990, 35, letter 12. 
 
64 Georges Bauquier, Fernand Léger: Catalogue Raisonné de l’oeuvre peint, 1903-1919 (Paris: I, 1990). 
 
65 In 1921, for example, the critic Arsène Alexandre commented that there were only four or five war 
paintings in the painting section of the Salon des Artistes Français. Arsène Alexandre, “Les Salons de 
1921: Le Salon des Artistes Français,” Le Fiagro 29, April 1921. More broadly, see, Philippe Dagen, Le 
silence des peintres: Les artistes face à la grande guerre (Paris: Fayard, 1996), and, Claire Maingon, 
L’âge critique des salons: 1914-1925: L’école française, la tradition et l’art moderne (Rouen: Publications 
de l’Université de Rouen et du Havre, 2014). 
 
	   33	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
	   34	  
 Léger’s transition from wartime to peacetime work largely took place in the artist’s 
working and reworking of a drawing of his Portrait de Philippon [Figure 17], one of the poilus 
with whom Léger served in the Champagne region. Green has explored the process by which the 
imaged body of Léger’s friend dematerialized and abstracted over several versions and 
eventually formed the basis for the painting, The Typographer [Figure 18].66 Though the 
effacement of this particular poilus has been read as one example of a clear delineation between 
Léger’s wartime and postwar work, one may also read this series as literally working through 
soldiers’ transition from military to civilian life. Léger’s choice to depict a typographer, a 
profession that, like the modern soldier, depends upon the machine, is also significant: the 
occupation was viewed as a specifically “modern” subject of particular importance to artists as a 
worker capable of disseminating copy to hundreds or thousands of readers. As Fredrich Kittler 
once quipped, the typewriter is the prosthesis of an absent speaker.67 
Yet, in other ways, there is good reason to believe that Léger’s embrace of postwar society 
was not as wholehearted as some authors have argued, or at least, that his enthusiasm was 
tempered over the course of two years. Consider Léger’s La Ville, the artist’s submission to the 
1920 Salon des Indépendants. A testament to the bustling pace, dynamism, and vibrancy of 
urban life, the painting is reminiscent of papier collé on account of its synthesis of geometric 
elements into a largely harmonious whole. Indeed, the individual elements of La Ville appear as 
if they might have been picked up from the wreckage of war and re-assembled into something 
useful. Léger builds his city through a taut, geometric composition that uses areas of flat, 
unmolded colors to produce a sense of cosmopolitan dynamism. Plumes of smoke, telephone 
poles, the silhouette of mannequins, and other signs of modern urbanism populate Léger’s 
bustling metropolis. 
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Still, what is one to make of the two men descending the staircase set prominently in the 
foreground between two bands of primary color? They neither appear equivalent to the 
“machine men” of Léger’s 1914 Escaliers paintings [Figure 19], nor do they seem to be the sort of 
mechanized man, purified by war, the Futurists had envisioned. Green has read them as men of 
the postwar generation in which Léger had placed his faith: “modern,” unsentimental, resistant 
to the conservative, national rhetoric of the Right, and open to positive responses from 
viewers.68 Yet it is a challenge to read them as anything other than what they are: faceless, 
anonymous, their eyes downcast, 
uninteresting in comparison to the exuberant 
city they inhabit. Léger may have intended to 
capture the vibrancy of postwar Paris, yet it’s 
hard not to read some degree of alienation of 
the individual into the canvas. 
 Precisely this simultaneous presence of 
alienation and liberation, the interplay of the 
collective and the individual, characterizes the 
“multiplicative vision” at play in Léger’s 
occupational portraits. Indeed, the tension 
between collectivism and the individual was a 
crucial aspect of discourses of rehabilitation in 
France following the first world war. 
Increasingly, and as Jackie Clark has 
compellingly argued, social and industrial 
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organization was viewed by economic and political elites as a means of addressing the social, 
economic, and political ills of France during the interwar period.69 This sentiment coincided 
with the widespread adoption of Taylorist and Fordist theories of scientific management, which, 
though present in Europe since the end of the ninetieth century, had found new life during and 
after World War I on the basis of their supposed ability to enact rational, constructive solutions 
that would counter the disruptions of war.70 By the 1920s, such theories had reshaped French 
industry in various fields, including labor productivity, technological efficiency, and corporate 
organization.  
 The influence of industrial organization and, more generally, collective forms of 
production, is perhaps nowhere more palpable than in Purism. Unburdened by nostalgia for the 
return to prewar normality, the Purists, led by Le Corbusier (né Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-
Gris) and Amédée Ozenfant, obsessively stressed logic and precision as the guiding principles of 
a new, rationally-organized society, qualities that were embodied, above all, by the machine. 
Nowhere was their admiration for technology and its social benefits more apparent than in the 
opening sentence of Après le cubisme, published in advance of the first Purist exhibition in 
December of 1918: “the War is over, everything organizes, everything is clarified and purified; 
factories rise already, nothing remains as it was before the War.”71 As its polemical title suggests, 
the Purists saw Cubism in all its forms as an outdated movement that had fractured into 
individual idioms, the disunity of which mirrored the chaos of the war that had just ended. 
Purism, by contrast, offered unity, reason, and collectivity fitting for the wounded, but 
victorious, nation. 	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Purism has long been understood in the context of the widespread artistic and social 
rappel à l’ordré that took place in France during and after World War I.72 As Kenneth Silver has 
shown, Purism brilliantly exploited the rhetoric of “order,” “the classical,” and the “new spirit” to 
legitimate the movement’s aesthetic production. At once “classical” and forward-thinking, the 
Purists were able to cast technology not as a demon of modernity but as a crucial element of the 
reconstruction of the nation. “With positivist certainties came political clarity,” writes 
Christopher Green, noting the apparent ease with which the Purists were able to integrate the 
machine into the reconstructive politics of postwar France.73 The movement’s advocacy of 
rational principles, logic, and precision appeared the perfect antidote to a country ravaged by 
war. It also comes as little surprise, then, that the Purists admired theories of scientific 
management and industrial organization. In a 1918 essay, Ozenfant and Le Corbusier praised 
Taylorism for its ability to replace “instinct [and] groping” with “scientific principles of analysis, 
organization, and classification.”74 
 Even before he began exhibiting with the Purists in February of 1921, Léger shared much 
of the movement’s fascination with and admiration for the machine. Between 1918 and 1925, 
Léger published several essays on the machine aesthetic, including his 1925 “L’esthétique de la 
machine: l’ordre géométrique et le vrai.”75 Léger’s technophilism extended, to some degree, to 
Purism’s avowed support of Taylorism as an organizing principle of industrial production: Léger 
wrote to Léonce Rosenberg in 1924 of the admiration he and Le Corbusier shared for the 
“dynamism” of big business.76 Léger’s frequent, though far from exclusive, depiction of 
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industrial subjects between 1918 and 1925, further underlines Léger’s own fascination with 
machines that the war had done little to stifle. Like Purists, Léger saw machines as a crucial and 
positive aspect of a reconstructed postwar society. 
  It was in this social and artistic context that Léger painted The Mechanic. On first 
glance, it vividly demonstrates Léger’s and, more generally, Purism’s positive outlook on the 
machine. The subject dominates the composition: his torso faces outwards towards the viewer, 
while his head gazes sideways, parallel to the picture plane. The pose—the head turned 90 
degrees away from the body—is, organically speaking, impossible. Yet there is something 
uncanny about the assembly of the mechanic’s body, as if each element had been built separately 
and fastened together (as they literally are in 1921’s Mother and Child). Their apparent 
independence suggests that they are capable of functioning both independently and as a whole; 
each has its own function that contributes, but is not equivalent to, the function of the complete 
body.  
Slight gradients of gray and silver in the mechanic’s flesh suggest that his body might be 
built from more than skin and bone. Most telling, though, is Léger’s handling of the paint at the 
body’s joints: the slightest hint of gray as the hand meets the arm emphasizes the distinction 
between the two elements of the body. Because of Léger’s treatment of hands and forearms as 
discrete entities, the painting exudes a sense of replicablility and standardization. One has the 
sense that were something to happen to an arm or a hand, another could simply be 
manufactured and replace whatever appendage had been lost. 
To be sure, the mechanical qualities of the mechanic’s appendages are almost certainly 
not literal evocations of artificial limbs, although Léger must have been familiar with such 
devices on a personal level through his service in the war. Moreover, Léger later used artificial 
limbs in his film Ballet Mécanique (for which Man Ray, whose own interest in the prosthetic will 
be discussed in chapter three, was the principal photographer). Though the mechanic’s hand 
bears at least some resemblance to the popular mechanical hand available for purchase at the 
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time, its form is somewhat too general to conclusively associate it with any particular model of 
prosthetic hand. What gives the mechanics imaged limbs their prosthetic quality, then, is not a 
specific visual reference, but their clear representation of the Taylorist body: an atomized group 
of individuated parts, standardized and interchangeable, each defined solely in terms of its 
clockwork potential. From this perspective, in which a prosthetic limb is conceptually identical 
to an organic limb in terms of function, there is no distinction between an organic limb and a 
prosthetic limb, a conclusion that is underlined in The Mechanic by the ambiguity of the 
subject’s limbs, which appear both organic and mechanical. 
On this view, all functional prostheses are limbs. Conversely, all limbs are prostheses—
but for what? As discussed in chapter one, Taylorism and prosthetics were a natural pairing due 
to the former’s ability to construe limbs, both artificial and organic, solely in terms of their 
clockwork essence. Fordism, too, quickly integrated artificial limbs into its theory. In his 1923 
autobiography, My Life and Work, Henry Ford echoes Marx’s theory of material social systems 
and compares the assembly line to an extension of the laborer’s body.77 Conversely, we might 
note, this view casts the laborer as an extension of the machine’s “body.” Ford explicitly notes 
that recent advances in industrial design led to machines that required little physical effort from 
their operators, who could then include “the slightest, weakest sort of men, or older women and 
children” as well as “legless men, one-legged men, one-armed men, and blind men.”78 Though 
wounded veterans were far more visible in France by virtue of its higher rate of injury coupled 
with its smaller population, Ford nevertheless makes clear that he has veterans in mind when 
discussing the plight of the disabled worker. 
Though scholars have debated the setting of The Mechanic, it is generally accepted that 
the painting’s subject is inside a factory, and the abstract forms behind him allude to assembly 
lines, conveyor belts, and other devices commonly found in the industrial work place, as well as 	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a number of other laborers.79 Keeping in mind Ford’s dictum that the worker is a prosthesis of 
the machine, this mechanic is not simply a professional worker at home in the world of 
machines. He is also named by his function within that system of production. Indeed, even 
among the professions that do not have any explicit connection to industrial labor, Léger never 
identifies his subjects by anything other than their occupation.  
Still, it is obvious in The Mechanic that the subject is not an assembly line worker like 
the two ethereal figures behind and to the right of him, whose bodies are formed by the bulbous 
and ephemeral puffs of smoke rising from the mechanic’s cigarette (ghosts in the machine, 
indeed!). Not only does the mechanic’s full-figured-ness underline his distinctness from the 
assembly line laborers, but his own costume, a tubular, black sleeveless shirt, is not the standard 
blue smock that would have been worn by factory laborers across France at this moment.80 How 
should the mechanic be read and situated within the structure of labor in the factory? 
In his 1962 Bodies and Machines, the literary critic Mark Seltzer argues that Taylorism 
not only radically altered the process of work by making it more “efficient,” but also generated 
new forms of labor, namely, an ascendant managerial class.81 Seltzer contends that “the real 
innovation of Taylorization becomes visible in the incorporation of the representation of the 
work process into the work process itself—or, better, the incorporation of the representation of 
the work process as the work process itself.”82 In short, the representation of labor through 
graphs, charts, diagrams, and flow charts, became a form of labor in and of itself: manual 
laborers were imaged in these equations by their managers. 	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 In 1916, Henri Fayol, one of France’s leading labor scientists, published Administration 
industrielle et générale, which quickly became one of the most influential works on industrial 
organization in the postwar period.83 Indebted to Taylorism but with somewhat different aims, 
Fayol’s volume was dedicated to principles of efficient administration in order to reduce 
“soldiering,” the perceived problem of laborers working at less than expected capacities. Fayol’s 
solution, which was ubiquitous in factories across France in the interwar period, was to take 
control of the labor process away from workers and foremen and give it to a new class of 
“engineer organizers,” who were capable of both managing labor in the factory and working with 
the machines themselves.84 Because the mechanic exhibits mastery over the machine and other 
men, it is not unreasonable to identify his profession as one of the “engineer-organizers” that 
Fayol envisioned and subsequently became a key part of the industrial class structure in France 
after the war. 
Whether or not The Mechanic is an “engineer-organizer” in the sense that Fayol 
described, it’s clear that Léger was attuned to the changes taking place in industrial organization 
in these years. Some forms labor was becoming more specialized, and the divide between skilled 
and unskilled was increasingly apparent; Léger’s mechanic exhibits no pictorial or spatial 
relationship to his co-workers, save the puff of smoke that binds the mechanic to his less skilled 
colleagues, linking foreground to background and subject to object. Moreover, The Mechanic 
alludes, if somewhat ambiguously, to the new visuality of labor under Taylorism, the so-called 
“representation of work as work,” as Selzter puts it.85 The precise bands and interpenetrating 
planes of color in The Mechanic are rightly read as allusions to the mechanical interiors of large 
factories: yet it seems equally likely that their form could allude to the graphs, charts, and 
diagrams that were increasingly popular tools for the “organization” and optimization of labor in 	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these years. Moreover, they might alternately read as allusions to the diagrams and schematics 
that mechanics would need to fix or operate industrial machinery.  
 Still, despite the allusions to labor, productivity, Taylorism, and new ideas about 
industrial efficiency that might be found in The Mechanic, it is crucial to note that, at the 
moment of Léger’s depiction of his subject, the mechanic is not engaged in any obviously 
productive task. Though supposedly a testament to the specialized laborer, equivalent to and 
contiguous with an industrial utopia whose body itself mirrors the machines and methods of 
modern industry, Léger retains a dose of individualism, or, at least, allows his subject to retain 
an identity outside of his titular profession. Though smoking could have been permitted in 
factories, depending on the nature of the goods being manufactured, Léger depicts the mechanic 
at a moment when he is not engaged in 
any obviously productive task—his left 
hand clenches his cigarette, while his 
right hand rests against his left arm. 
Likewise, though his tattoo alludes to 
another profession—as a dockworker, a 
merchant marine, or, perhaps, a veteran 
of the French Navy—a tattoo functions 
as a demonstration of the subject’s 
control over the appearance of his own 
body.  
Indeed, given that the tattoo was 
not present in the 1918 version of The 
Mechanic [Figure 20], one could 
justifiably read the second version of the Figure 20 
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painting as re-asserting, to some degree, the “human,” a conclusion mirrored (or not) by the less 
obviously metallic skin tone of the second version. Léger underlines this through his handling of 
the tattoo; while its applications is far from expressionist, it is nonetheless possible to sense at 
least some of the hand of the artist present in the work, particularly when compared to the sharp 
lines of the diagrammatic and industrial workplace his body inhabits. 
 This ambiguity presages at least some of Léger’s tension with the Purists and the artist’s 
eventual defection from the movement in 1925. In the catalogue to the 1971 exhibition Léger 
and Cubist Paris, John Golding notes that Léger did not share Ozenfant’s and Jeanneret’s 
specific emphasis on mathematics and was rather indifferent to the mystique of the number. 
Moreover, as Golding puts it, “[Léger] was a popular artist . . . and he sensed that [Purism] was 
an elitist position and that there was something a little cold and inhuman about their art.”86 
Though clearly influenced by Taylorism, and at least somewhat sympathetic to its more positive 
goals, Léger nevertheless retains a place for non-industrial forms of labor, and, indeed, 
entertainment, even if he couches them in terms of large-scale social organization—a 
“multiplicative vision” of a rehabilitated France in the years after the Great War.  
In Léger’s postwar body of painting, the prosthetic, both as an object and a concept, 
plays a role in acknowledging the simultaneous potential of the machine as a device possessed of 
both empowering potentials and restrictive limits. Léger’s prosthesis are not the literal artificial 
limbs of Jules Amar, though Léger’s limbs share some visual similarity with the most popular 
models of prostheses available in the early 1920s. More importantly, they allude to the 
functionalist conception of the body articulated in works such as Organisation and “La 
Prothèse,” which was an conceptual precondition for Amar’s vision for the role prosthetic limbs 
would play in postwar France. At the same time, Léger’s The Mechanic also demonstrates one 	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way in which the concept of the prosthetic was being abstracted at this time: following the idea 
that the worker is a prosthesis of the industrial machine, Léger’s The Mechanic demonstrates 
that the distinction between laborer and machine was less distinct than ever before. Of course, 
that division was still intimately related to the laborer’s body. It would fall to others to complete 
the prosthetic’s transformation from material artifact to discursive framework. 
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III.  Man Ray’s Prosthetic Dada 
 
“Anything can take the place of a poem,” exclaimed Louis Aragon in the spring of 1923, 
two years after the first of Paris Dada’s Friday night cabarets in what would arguably become the 
movement’s final home.87 Poetry, of course, had been a crucial component of Dada aesthetics 
from its inception as a movement of studied incoherence. Whether it was Hugo Ball reading 
sound poetry in the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich or Richard Huelsenbeck performing his own 
chance-based “bruitist poems” in Berlin, the public reading of poetry, played a major role in 
defining Dada to both its practitioners and its audience. Yet Ball’s “sound poetry,” Tzara’s 
“simultaneous poetry,” and Huelsenbeck’s “bruitist poetry,” all entailed, to some degree, a 
conscious act of “creation.”88 The poets of Paris Dada, by contrast, did not “create” poetry so 
much as they coopted it, by reading art reviews, newspaper clippings, and, most famously, a 
parliamentary address. In contrast to the more obviously political aims of Berlin Dada, Paris 
Dada was more concerned with radicalizing the creative act by spontaneously introducing 
whatever was anonymous, and mundane into artistic production.  
In his essay on Paris in the catalogue to the 2006-2007 exhibition Dada, Witkovsky 
briefly glosses Aragon’s famous dictum, noting that “new verse, art reviews, and Tzara’s reading 
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of a parliamentary address . . . were all to be considered truly modern poetry.”89 Witkovsky 
points toward one way in which Dada redefined what could constitute a work of art or poetry, 
but his observation (admittedly made in passing) could go further. Aragon’s point was not that 
uninteresting bits of printed media were poems as such, but that they were being read and 
performed in the place of—instead of—both Dada poetry and more conventional forms of poetry. 
The distinction between these two positions—that is, what is considered modern poetry and 
what takes the place of poetry—is fairly subtle, but it has significant implications for the ways in 
which Dada defined and situated itself against the cultural institutions its creative productions 
mocked. 
If a supposedly “mundane” piece of text can take the place of poetry, it follows that 
whatever text is taking the place of a poem is not, in fact, poetry. Recall Duchamp’s (only 
somewhat) rhetorical question posed some years earlier: “Can one makes works which are not 
works of art?”90 Aragon poses the parallel question, can one makes poems that are not poetry? 
To be sure, the Dadaists, in their irreverence, were committed to mocking the traditional ideal of 
poetry by raising supposedly uninteresting texts to the “elevated” condition of poetry. Yet, in 
other ways, they were also sensitive and responsive to poetry’s social function, even if their 
attentiveness to its social uses ultimately served their critique. In order for “anything” to take 
poetry’s place, it follows that poetry had a “place” to begin with—in this case, on the stages of 
cabarets across Paris.91  
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Yet what, exactly, made poetry so easy to replace for the practitioners of Paris Dada? In 
some ways, the content of what was taking the place of poetry mattered far less than the fact that 
it was taking a poem’s place. Mundane forms of printed media were poetry because they 
functioned as if they were poetry. In short, the ease with which anything could take the place of 
poetry resulted from an apparent emphasis on its socially-validated function. I propose that it 
was, above all, this barren epistemological régime of all-encompassing functionalism that the 
Paris Dadaists situated themselves against. In a society in which metal could take the place of 
flesh by replicating the function of flesh, is it so hard to believe that nothing was secure so long 
as all things were viewed in terms of their possible function? 
Aragon, in other words, envisioned these found texts as a kind of “prosthesis” for the 
poems whose place they took. Though poetry had traditionally been considered a “private art,” 
the public performance of poems was an essential element of Dada practice. Yet the “found 
poetry” theorized by Aragon was read instead of earlier forms of Dada poetry. In a sense, 
appropriation was taking the place of creation—quotidian words took the place of conjured 
phrases. That Aragon himself never described found poetry as a prosthesis does not change the 
fact that the logic that informs his statement is prosthetic logic. Artificial limbs, of course, were 
never understood as one to one replacements for organic limbs. As Amar reminds us, their 
purpose is to “make up for a function lost or greatly reduced.”92 In similar terms, Aragon’s 
radical claim thus constitutes a form of prosthetic logic, yet one that mocks the entire notion of 
the prosthetic as it was understood in postwar France. If “anything” can conceivably fulfill one 
culturally validated function for poetry, how valuable was that designation to begin with?  
Man Ray’s Readymade sculptures produced under the influence of Paris Dada and 
emergent Surrealism reproduce the basic logic of this prosthetic critique, yet with “sculpture” 	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rather than “poetry” as the target of their derision. Sculpture, as W.J.T Mitchell writes, “does not 
project virtual space; it occupies a real site, obtruding on it or changing it.”93 From this 
perspective, sculpture is the artistic embodiment of not only space, but place. Writing of this 
distinction, Heidegger contended that sculptures “themselves are places and do not merely 
belong to place.”94 Yet in either case, the characteristics of place, whether embodied or occupied, 
are vulnerable to substitution and prosthetic replacement. 
 Before turning to Man Ray’s Readymades, it is crucial to establish what, exactly, was at 
stake for Man Ray, Louis Aragon, and the rest of the artists and writers associated, however 
loosely, with Paris Dada. Despite the clear connections between Paris Dada and political 
philosophies of anarchy, scholars, until relatively recently, have characterized the movement 
largely in terms of its iconoclasm, rather than its specific anarchist politics. As Michel Sanouillet 
writes in his foundational study Dada in Paris: 
 In any case, nothing transpired in the Dadaist documents of the epoch other than a 
coldly flaunted disdain for all political games and players. This indifference, surprising 
enough considering the vehement revolutionary and pacifist proclamations of the young 
dadaists, distinguishes very nearly the Parisian movement from its Germanic 
counterparts, all of whose activities were determine by the political events that marked 
the end of the war of 1914-1918 in Germany. It equally differentiates Dada from 
Surrealism, one of whose constants would be precisely this need for intervention in 
public affairs.95 
 
Sanouillet’s apolitical reading of Paris Dada has been referenced and reproduced across much of 
the body of literature on the movement. Christopher Green, in his Cubism and its Enemies, 
devotes a chapter to Paris Dada, but concentrates exclusively on its readily definable proto-
Surrealist elements and largely ignores the admittedly thorny question of its political 
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dimensions.96 In his own study of Dada, Richard Sheppard maintains that Paris Dada was 
resolutely apolitical, noting that despite its practitioners’ willingness to agitate and provoke, 
they were nevertheless “unconcerned to base [their provocations] upon a metaphysics, unwilling 
to define the aims of their revolt and disdainful of practical politics and political thinking.”97  
Though recent scholarship on the points of contact between the various modernisms, 
counter-modernisms, and cultural politics in postwar France has transformed our 
understanding of postwar French art and culture, these historiographical advances have largely 
left Paris Dada behind. For the most part, the movement languishes either as an amorphous 
moment in the pre-history of Surrealism in France or as a rowdy, but ill-defined, counterpart to 
the more revolutionary Berlin Dada. Yet Theresa Papanikolas rightly insists in her 1999 
dissertation that, despite the lack of a clearly identifiable political agenda, Paris Dada was far 
from “apolitical.”98 It is true that the political commitments of Paris Dada did not align with any 
specific political movement. Still, as Papanikolas argues, it is equally true that philosophies of 
anarcho-individualism circulated and flourished in Paris Dada circles, and the entire movement 
was based upon a unitary vision of social transformation and upheaval that would ennoble and 
activate the “individual.”99 These associations help explain the frequent references to and 	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conscious, if somewhat tongue in cheek, emulation of, the principles and events of the French 
Revolution by the members of Paris Dada.100 
 Still, even without accepting that Paris Dada was wholly dependent upon a specific set of 
Nietzchean philosophers, it is quite obvious that a virulent strain of individualism runs through 
Dada, leading its practitioners to oppose any form of control over the individual as a sovereign 
being. Among self-avowed advocates of political anarchy, even anarcho-communism was seen as 
too constricting an ideology on the basis of its need for collective organization. And if even 
anarcho-communism was to be opposed on this basis, then virtually all systems of organization 
deserved even more vigorous opposition. Paris Dada’s ideological enemies included pre-war 
forms of social and political hegemony, but also and especially the various constructivist and 
reconstructivist agendas that were imagined in the wake of the war, including the “rationalist” 
Taylorism of Amar and the Purist utopia of Ozenfant and Jeanneret. In short, the cultural 
politics of Paris Dada resisted the supposed anti-individualism of modern life and its neat 
arrangement of autonomous bodies into their “proper” place in the socially-validated capitalist 
network. 
 In the literature on Paris Dada, the movement’s resistance to all forms of organized 
power has often and rightly been understood in terms of its formal innovation.101 By contrast, I 
wish to locate Paris Dada’s individualist cultural resistance not only in formal innovation, but 
also in formal intervention. Because “intervention” must always be performed on something, it 
represents both a disruption of the object-as-form and the socially-conditioned purpose of that 	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object. And though intervention into an object does not necessarily usurp its intended function 
(“modding” an object, for example, often makes a given object perform its intended task more 
effectively), a common feature of artworks produced under the aegis of Paris Dada is 
interventions that directly contradict the commercially-conditioned purpose of a given object. 
 Though the market and commercially produced products played at least some role in 
each of Dada’s adopted locales, the market was especially important for Paris Dada.102 Under 
Tzara’s direction, “Dada” was attached to various forms of artistic production—Dadapoem and 
Dadaphoto, for example—consciously emulating and mocking the techniques for branding being 
used in the commercial sphere. Indeed, Man Ray, like Marcel Duchamp, was particularly 
interested in engaging products found in the market place, or, at least the flea market, and often 
applied a “trademark” symbol along with his signature on his work.103 His actions were not lost 
on his colleagues in Paris Dada, who associated Man Ray’s frequent allusions to commercialism 
with his distinct “Americanism,” the same “Americanism” that was coming to dominate French 
discourses of industrial management.104 
The Readymades of Duchamp and Man Ray have long been understood in terms of their 
challenge to traditional notions of the work of art by replacing ontology with contextualization. 
Inexorably, the beholder is imbricated in both the “being” and “meaning” of the work of art, 
disrupting the fictive boundary between art and life.105 Yet, as Helen Molesworth convincingly 	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argues, the Readymades are also a kind of anti-Taylorist gesture, or at least representations of a 
perverse form of Taylorism.106 They resist the rationalization of domestic and “professional” 
work by refusing the distinction between those discourses. As Molesworth writes, 
  The antifunctionality [of the Readymades] is not solely about their stymied use and 
exchange value as commodities but has a more literal component. They are 
antifunctional as in antiwork: they resist their intended, mandated, standardized use . . . 
they resist the working subject, offering instead the involuntary, distracted subject of 
play.107 
 
Though Molesworth is largely concerned with 
Duchamp’s Readymades, her interpretation is equally 
applicable to Man Ray’s Cadeau (1921) [Figure 21]. In 
a well-known Dada vignette (though one of dubious 
authenticity), on the afternoon of his first solo 
exhibition in Paris in February 1921, Man Ray, with 
the assistance of the composer Erik Satie, impulsively 
purchased an iron, brass tacks, and glue. Man Ray 
then assembled the object in the gallery, using glue to 
affix fourteen tacks to the bottom side of the iron and 
propping the object up such that its row of metallic 
“teeth” confronted the viewer. Though Man Ray had 
planned to invite his friends to draw lots for the work, 
which they ironically christened Cadeau, the object was stolen sometime in the course of the 
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evening’s events.108 
Most interpretations of Cadeau have centered on three aspects of the work: its frank and 
violent eroticism, a common feature of Man Ray’s artistic output throughout his career; the 
work’s relationship to Man Ray’s biography (Man Ray’s father was a tailor); and the gendered 
labor to which the piece alludes.109 In a frequently cited quote, Man Ray is reported to have 
said, “You can tear a dress to ribbons with [Cadeau]. I did it once, and asked a beautiful 18-year-
old colored girl to wear it as she danced. Her body showed through as she moved around, like a 
bronze in movement.”110 To be sure, the often uncomfortable sexual politics of Man Ray and his 
contemporaries are a crucial intellectual context for Cadeau. Without discounting Man Ray’s 
allusions to sexual violence or domesticated, “feminine” labor, however, I wish to focus my 
inquiry on the work’s deliberate manifestation of non-functionality—or, more accurately, its 
anti-functionality, a tactic Man Ray likely inherited from Duchamp.111 More than simply 
stripping the iron of its ability to fulfill the task for which it was designed and manufactured, 
Man Ray’s formal intervention into the object aggressively contradicts the iron’s intended usage, 
tearing apart the very fabric it was meant to smooth. For a tailor, it would be a poor gift indeed. 
Still, among commentators who have come to this conclusion, it is a common and 
somewhat uncritical trope to refer to Cadeau as “functionless” or some variant thereof. And 
while someone wishing to iron a shirt would certainly find Cadeau a useless piece of metal, Man 
Ray imagined a very specific function for Cadeau: as an object that was to be included in his first 	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solo exhibition in his newly adopted home town—that is, as a sculpture. Exhibition value, of 
course, only constitutes one of the many possible functions for sculpture, yet given the proximity 
of Cadeau’s creation to Man Ray’s exhibition, it is hard to argue that its immediate exhibition 
was not the artist’s intention. In much the same way that Aragon claimed that “anything can 
take the place of a poem,” including (and especially) things that are surely not poems, Cadeau 
demonstrates that “anything” can take the place of a sculpture, thus mocking any definition of 
sculpture that focuses on sculpture’s “place” and “function.” In terms of Brown’s thing theory, 
the violation of the iron’s commercially defined “objecthood” makes Cadeau into a “thing” only 
with respect to the particular subject-object relationship that its commercial function entails. 
Yet in the context of the commercial art gallery, Cadeau has had bestowed upon it a separate 
objecthood attendant on the (literally) definitive powers of a different subject, Man Ray himself.  
The piece elegantly thematizes the ways in which objects have a definable place and value with 
respect to the system in which they are situated and understood. The transient nature of 
“sculpture” that is exposed by Cadeau therefore mocks not only the work of art itself, but also 
the patters and forms of social and cultural practice that conditioned and received the work. 
The version of Cadeau that was supposedly stolen between the time of its assembly and 
the close of Man Ray’s exhibition was the first of many created or authorized by Man Ray over 
the course of his career. In 1972, for example, Galleria II Fauno in Turin, with Man Ray’s 
permission and assistance, produced an saleable “edition” of eleven copies of Cadeau. In the 
process of preparing for the edition, Man Ray assembled five copies of Cadeau, most of which 
constitute the various Cadeaus now housed in museum collections. Yet finding the exact make 
and model of the flat iron that Man Ray had used in his 1921 original proved impossible. Indeed, 
acquiring five copies of any one make and model of iron in use in France between the wars 
proved impossible. As a consequence of this scarcity, the five preparatory versions, the eleven in 
Galleria II Fauno’s editioned set, and the other one-off versions Man Ray assembled throughout 
his career all make use of different “raw materials,” resulting in significant variation from 
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version to version. Man Ray likewise used metal and brass tacks in alternation, while the type of 
glue as well as its application required adjustment on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
construction and material of the tacks and the iron onto which they were affixed. 
Man Ray’s willingness to substitute different versions of the same commercial object for 
Cadeau further emphasizes the artist’s desire to focus the viewer’s attention not on the object as 
such, but on its functional capacities, as at once a work of art,  a commercial product, and a 
refusal of those categories. Just as Aragon mocks poetry by claiming that any mundane piece of 
writing may take its place, Man Ray mocks sculpture by revealing the ease with which 
supposedly un-interesting products of market capitalism can be accepted as sculpture, thus 
revealing how artificial the entire designation was to begin with. Crucially, the artificiality of 
“sculpture” is thematized by the explicit emphasis on function as the primary determinant of an 
object’s character: when function is taken as an object’s “essential” character, anything can 
easily take that object’s place.  
Yet if the Readymade is, as Molesworth reads it, an explicitly anti-Taylorist gesture, then 
it may also be read as an anti-prosthetic gesture. As Molesworth writes, “if the innovation of 
Taylorism is the representation of work as work,” then the Readymade is a perverse Taylorism. 
Likewise, in prosthetic terms, Cadeau is a prosthesis for the work of art: a perverse prosthesis 
that mocks its very condition of being.112 Prosthetics, in the view of Amar and many others, were 
only said to be “successful” when they replaced the function of whatever had been lost: yet this 
definition of success carried with it the admission that limbs, organic or artificial, could be made 
standardized and interchangeable, and therefore had no claim to individuality. Prosthetics, as a 
material practice, were thus opposed to individualism. An uncritical acceptance of prosthetics as 
a “successful” replacement for whatever had been lost would have struck the practitioners of 
Paris Dada as precisely the kind of anti-individualist regime the movement opposed.  
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Man Ray returned to this 
theme in his 1923 work, Object to be 
Destroyed [Figure 22], in which a 
single photographic eye, affixed to 
the pendulum of a purchased 
metronome, gazes out at the viewer 
with unyielding intensity. Printed in 
and cut from gelatin silver and 
affixed to the metronome by a 
common paperclip, the gently 
rounded edges of the photograph 
mimic the shape of the elegant, 
feminine eye and piqued eyebrow 
contained within its “frame.” The 
metronome ticks precisely at the 
tempo Man Ray set—168 beats per 
minute, more than twice the speed of 
the human heart at rest, thus mirroring the emotional intensity of the beholder’s encounter with 
Object to be Destroyed. Back and forth it ticks (and tocks), passing from left to right (and right 
to left) in its perpetual semi-circular passage, petulant and immune to the desires of the 
increasingly agitated viewer.  
Like Cadeau, Object to be Destroyed has existed in multiple variations, many of which, 
as its title suggests, were destroyed. Indeed, Man Ray intended for there to be a possibly 
limitless number of versions. In 1932, the artist, then fully engaged with and embroiled in 
Surrealism, published “Object of Destruction” in the Surrealist journal This Quarter, in which 
Figure 22 
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he described the process of Object to be Destroyed’s creation and distribution, and, 
simultaneously, commanded readers to do copy the process for themselves:  
  Cut out the eye from a photograph of one who has been loved, but it seen no more. 
Attach the eye to the pendulum of a metronome and regulate the weight to suit the temp 
desired. Keep going to the limit of endurance. With a hammer, well-aimed, try to destroy 
the whole in a single blow.113 
 
Despite the proliferation of Object to by Destroyed implied by this statement, Man Ray 
did, however, see his 1934 version of Object to be Destroyed as the definitive version of the work 
due to the artist’s use of an imaged eye drawn from that of his model, pupil, and one-time lover, 
Lee Miller. As Miller recalls in a later interview, “that object had existed already, done some 
years before, with an eye that came along. But at the time he added my eye [1932], he titled it 
Object à détruire.”114 The biographical dimensions of Object to be Destroyed have been 
examined by Janine Mileaf, who argues that the object “consolidates its specific meaning around 
the life of the artist.”115 Man Ray, despite his own promiscuity, was disturbed by Miller’s credo of 
sexual freedom, and throughout their tumultuous relationship, he was plagued by Miller’s 
measured infidelity and irreverence towards his ideas about their interdependence. When Miller 
eventually left the artist in 1932, a despondent Man Ray produced a series of photographs 
depicting his own suicide and expressed his anger towards Miller by sending her the precursor 
to the definitive version of Object to by Destroyed: a photograph of her eye, cut out from a larger 
image and signed in the creases of the skin below her lashes. Man Ray was, by all accounts, 
disturbed by the control Miller was capable of exerting over him, even in absentia. He abhorred, 
above all, being made into an object: Object to be Destroyed, as sardonic and critical a work as 
Man Ray ever created, performs this very operation, mirroring the artist’s own “objectification” 
by another. 	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For readers of the present day, the imaged eye of Object to be Destroyed evokes Jacques 
Lacan’s essay “The Line and Light,” in which Lacan examines the eye and its relationship to 
subjecthood: the object, whatever it may be, captures us in its trap.116 The object stares back, 
and, in doing so, undermines the apparent subjecthood of the viewer: Object to be Destroyed is 
a literal representation of this phenomenon. Man Ray, in these years, was likewise obsessed with 
Voodoo: Mileaf links Man Ray’s creative imagining of the work in 1929 with a love charm 
described in William Seabrook’s novel The Magic Island:  
 Two needles of equal length are stood upright, side by side, baptized with suitable 
incantations, and are given the names of the youth and his unwilling girl. The needles are 
then left side by side, parallel but reversed, so that the point of each presses against the 
eye of the other. The point is symbolic of the phallus and the eye symbolic of the vulva.117 
 
In this reading, Miller’s imaged eye takes the place of the eye of the needle, thus alluding 
to intercourse through the motion of the (feminine) eye and masculine pendulum. Yet the 
composure of the “unwilling girl’s” eye implies that even the striking, incessant blows of the 
pendulum are not enough to dominate her. Though the charm is intended to persuade the girl to 
return to her suitor, the maker, “the object retains powers outside the control of its maker.”118 
Mileaf therefore reads Object to be Destroyed as a kind of “surrogate body” for Miller, 
made animate by the incessant heart-like ticking of the metronome and the perpetual gaze of 
Miller’s imaged eye. Yet Mileaf might have just as easily said that Object to be Destroyed is a 
kind of prosthetic body, in that it takes the place of a body that had been lost (if only to Man 
Ray). Unlike Cadeau, which acts solely as a prosthesis for the work of art, Object to be 
Destroyed functions as a prosthesis for both the work of art and a real, organic body. Object to 	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be Destroyed thus makes a clear connection between conceptual prostheses and the organic 
bodies that first provoked reflection on and remained a key image for prosthetic logic. 
Is it so wrong to believe that, somewhere within its irreverent excess, Paris Dada had a 
redemptive, even moralizing tone? Dada developed in response to an industrial war that, in the 
view of nearly all Dada practitioners, dehumanized soldiers. In this view, death was reduced to 
little more than a mathematical abstractions. Yet even in the peace that followed, the individual, 
in the view of Paris Dada, was far from liberated. Men, women, skilled and unskilled laborers, 
poems, sculptures, artists—all had a “proper” place in the great social machine, constructed and 
operated by political and cultural elites for their own ends.  
Of course, in some ways, politics for Paris Dada was more self-reflexive than 
interventionist. Yet even if Paris Dada’s belief in the sovereignty of every individual was more 
resolute in theory than in practice—much has been made of the misogyny of Paris Dada, and of 
Man Ray in particular—the movement demonstrates an acute concern for the culture of 
machinery and its dehumanizing effects on the individual. In the view of Paris Dada, the 
ultimate injustice of the social “machine” was its refusal to acknowledge the individual as 
anything other than one more object to be set in its place: one more arm to be “remade” and 
attached to an assembly line. Paris Dada, above all, defined itself against the objectification of 
the individual by mirroring and mocking the logic by which the individual was objectified. This 
was, above all, the logic of the prosthesis made visible not only by prosthetics as a specific class 
of medical objects, but also through a willingness to see all things as apparently replaceable.  
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Epilogue 
In his canonical 1963 text Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, Marshall 
McLuhan claims that the form of the medium, rather than the message it conveys, has the 
greatest impact on the society that consumes it.119 Media changes our experience of the world by 
restructuring our bodies on a fundamental level. The integration of technology into human lives 
and bodies alter not only what bodies do, but what also can be done: subjectivity is conditioned 
the body’s technological extensions. McLuhan’s definition of media is inclusive. The printing 
press is a kind of prosthetic mouth, our clothing, prosthetic skin. Still, McLuhan’s essay is often 
misread as an optimistic account of man as an untroubled prosthetic god. If media gives human 
beings more ways of being and acting in the world, too often the question of where these 
extensions come from and at what cost they are used is ignored. 
Writing for the American Historical Association in 1998, Peter Stearns notes that 
history “offers the only extensive evidential base for the contemplation and analysis of how 
societies function.”120 History, in this view, provides perspective, both meditative and analytical, 
on contemporary events. Without history, there is only an all-encompassing presentism that 
denies the basis upon which humans may make choices informed by the mistakes and successes 
of the past. Fatalist pronouncements and naïve exaltations of the present day “uberization” of all 
things, in which digital devices prosthetically connect each user to every other, share a common 
feature: they believe their subject to be a condition, whether a defect or a benefit, endemic to a 
networked society. Yet this view denies the ancestry of these micro-economies. The “share 
economy” can be read as the fulfillment of Jules Amar’s Taylorist fantasies, which 
conceptualized laborers in terms familiar to the architects of the cybernetic economy: as beings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 31. 
 
120 Peter Stearns, “Why Study History?,” American Historical Association, accessed April 6, 2015, 
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/archives/why-study-
history-%281998%29. 
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of information and function. Amar had the vision but lacked the tools. Writing of the transition 
from the machine age to the information age, Brian Holmes has presciently noted that  
  . . . the technological apparatus has only been more fully developed . . . while its cultural 
justifications have merely twisted to reflect a more callous opportunism  . . . All these 
technological systems involve people in a new relation between controller and 
controlled.121 
 
 As Matthew Biro has argued, the 1920s represent a moment when cultural producers of 
all political persuasions came to understand economies, cultural and otherwise, in what are now 
called “cybernetic” terms122: as a networked array of actors defined by their informative and 
functional capacities, operating in a validated place in the social machine. Such ideas were 
integrated into fantasies of national rehabilitation, and their popularity owes much to their 
promise to counteract the disorganizing effects of war with logic, precision, and reason. Yet 
others saw such ideas for what they also were: one more operation of power that objectified the 
individual and the body. 
At one end of this spectrum was Jules Amar’s blind optimism in prostheses; on the other 
was Man Ray’s critique of the logic required to sustain such optimism. And somewhere in 
between rests the occupational portraits of Fernand Léger, which articulate what Blairite social 
democrats of the 1990s might refer to as “The Third Way.” Léger, the veteran, knew better than 
most that technology, when combined with power, reduces human beings to variables in an 
equation whose “solution” was mass death. His gradual reintroduction of the human into his 
portraits suggests a belief that the dehumanizing effects of technological warfare could still be 
found in industrial peace. At the same time, however, Léger saw the potential for machines to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Robby Hearst, “Hinting at Ways to Work in Current Contexts: An Interview with Brian Holmes,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Protest 4 (February 2005). 
 
122 Biro defines cybernetics as the “study of feedback, communication, and control in human beings, 
machines, and other organized systems,” emerged as a field of research during World War II, but its 
origins lie in the earlier assumption that, “by understanding human beings and machines in terms of their 
functions, researchers could discover the multiple ways in which they were commensurate.” This 
assumption, as he argues, dates to the years after World War I, a view with which I agree. Biro, The Dada 
Cyborg, 3. 
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constructive instruments of peace, devices for the “betterment” of society. The Mechanic is 
caught between these irreconcilable positions. Without the mechanical innovations Léger 
admired, the world would be a technological backwater, but without humanity, it would be a 
corporate nightmare. Prosthetics did not cause this situation, but they were a catalyst for its 
development and would not be conceivable without it. The belief in prosthetics presupposes a 
belief in function; a belief in function presupposes a subject who names the function and an 
object that carries that burden. Controller and controlled become axiomatic. No appropriation is 
greater or more terrible than that of the body, the logical extreme of utopian dreams and 
materialist nightmares.  
T.J. Clark’s proposed that the modern art “continually, relentlessly proposes that human 
qualities, once implicit and embedded in the texture of experience . . . are on the verge of 
extinction.”123 The art of modernism, in this view, “is an act of dialectical retrieval,” a chance to 
find human qualities once more in a world that has compressed them into bits of information 
that exist as the to background of buying and selling.124 It is not enough to resist—the challenge 
is not to live without the prosthetic. It is how to live with the prosthetic in spite of itself, to never 
lose sight of the ghost in the machine. 
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